← All 148 executive actions

Trump Administration Lifts and Eases Sanctions on Russia, Belarus, Syria and Others

Foreign Affairs Jan 20, 2025
Our Analysis: Concerning

Since January 2025, the Trump administration has lifted or eased U.S. sanctions on governments, companies and people in at least ten countries. The largest steps involve three countries. In Syria, it ended the sanctions program, backed the repeal of the Caesar Act and removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In Belarus, it lifted sanctions on the potash industry, state banks and the national airline in exchange for prisoner releases. In Russia, it allowed sales of Russian oil already at sea, authorized Russian diesel imports and waived the Graham Act sanctions that Trump had signed weeks earlier. It also removed sanctions on Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, an aide to Hungary's Viktor Orbán, Venezuela's interim leaders, allies of Myanmar's military government and violent Israeli settlers, and it exempted Hungary from sanctions on Russian energy.

The administration's stated reasons differ by case. It cited reconstruction and stability in Syria, the release of political prisoners in Belarus, lower fuel prices during the U.S. war with Iran, and progress toward peace in Ukraine. In several cases, the Treasury Department gave no public reason. The administration has also imposed new sanctions, including on Russia's two largest oil companies in October 2025, and officials say most sanctions on Russia remain in place.

Lawmakers from both parties objected to the Russia steps, and Democrats objected to the Dodik and Orbán-aide delistings. The Syria repeal had bipartisan support in Congress. Reporting by The New York Times and The Guardian found that people seeking relief in Syria and Bosnia had business or lobbying ties to Trump's family, lawyers and political advisers. A Trump donor and business partners of his negotiators' families are among the bidders for Lukoil's foreign assets. The parties deny that these ties shaped policy, and no investigation has found an exchange.

Details

Since President Trump returned to office in January 2025, his administration has lifted or eased U.S. sanctions in a series of separate decisions. Some were announced by the president himself, such as the end of Syria sanctions in May 2025 and the Russian diesel arrangement in October 2026. Others appeared only as Treasury Department notices with no stated reason. The administration has linked the relief to peace talks, prisoner releases, fuel prices during the U.S. war with Iran, and reconstruction after war. It has also imposed new sanctions in the same period, including on Russia's largest oil companies. Members of Congress from both parties have objected to several decisions, especially on Russia. Investigative reporting has found that in some cases, people seeking relief had business, lobbying or political ties to Trump's family and advisers. The parties involved deny that those ties influenced policy.

Overview

The main relief actions, in order:

  • January 20, 2025: Trump ended the sanctions program on violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank.
  • April 2, 2025: Treasury removed Karina Rotenberg, wife of a Putin ally, from its sanctions list.
  • April 15, 2025: Treasury removed Antal Rogán, Orbán's cabinet chief, from its sanctions list.
  • May 13–23, 2025: Trump announced the end of Syria sanctions, and Treasury and the State Department issued the first relief.
  • June 2025: Hungary said the United States had lifted sanctions holding up its Paks II nuclear project. Syria's sanctions program ended on July 1.
  • July 2025: Treasury removed sanctions on allies of Myanmar's military government. Chevron received a restricted license to resume limited work in Venezuela.
  • September 11, 2025: The United States eased sanctions on Belarus's national airline after 52 prisoners were freed.
  • October 29, 2025: Treasury removed sanctions on Milorad Dodik and dozens of his allies.
  • November 2025: Syria's president was removed from the U.S. terrorism sanctions list, and Hungary received a one-year exemption from sanctions on Russian energy.
  • December 2025: The United States lifted sanctions on Belarus's potash sector, Congress repealed the Caesar Act on Syria, and Treasury removed sanctions on Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes.
  • January–April 2026: After the capture of Nicolás Maduro, Treasury issued licenses for Venezuelan oil and removed sanctions on interim President Delcy Rodríguez.
  • March–June 2026: Treasury allowed sales of Russian and Iranian oil already at sea, and on June 22 it issued a 60-day license for Iranian oil that it revoked on July 7.
  • March 26, 2026: Treasury removed Belarus's state potash producer and its trading arm from the sanctions list.
  • August 24, 2026: Syria was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
  • October 9–16, 2026: Treasury authorized Russian diesel imports, and Trump waived the sanctions in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act.

Russia

Trump has eased U.S. sanctions on Russia while Russia's war against Ukraine continues. In 2026, his administration allowed sales of Russian oil already at sea, authorized Russian diesel imports, and waived a new sanctions law he had signed. The diesel and waiver steps came within one week in October 2026, as diesel prices sat near record highs during the U.S. war with Iran and less than a month before the November 3 midterm elections. Ukraine's president, European officials, and members of Congress from both parties criticized them. The administration says they are aimed at lowering fuel prices and that most existing sanctions on Russia remain in place.

2025: Talks, a Summit and New Sanctions

On February 18, 2025, senior U.S. and Russian officials met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and agreed to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, the Associated Press reported. Ukrainian and European officials were not included. On April 2, 2025, the Treasury Department removed Karina Rotenberg from its sanctions list without explanation, OCCRP reported. She is the wife of billionaire Boris Rotenberg, a childhood friend of Putin, and had been sanctioned in March 2022 after Russia's full-scale invasion. Her husband remains under sanctions imposed in 2014. Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov wrote, "Tariffs on allies, lifting sanctions on enemies."

Trump and Putin met at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage on August 15, 2025. They reached no agreement to end the war, The New York Times reported. Before the summit, Trump had threatened Russia with "severe consequences" if it did not agree to an immediate halt to the fighting. On August 16, he dropped that demand, AFP reported. He said "the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement." After the summit, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) said on MSNBC that the photo opportunity legitimized war crimes, the Times reported. A framed photo of Trump with Putin, which appeared to come from the summit, was later hung in the White House's remodeled Palm Room, CNN reported.

Trump also pressed other countries to stop buying Russian oil. On July 14, 2025, at a White House meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump threatened "secondary tariffs" of "about 100%" on countries that buy Russian exports if Russia did not agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine within 50 days, CNBC reported. CNBC said such tariffs could fall hardest on China, India, Brazil, and Turkey. On August 6, 2025, he signed Executive Order 14329, which placed an additional 25 percent duty on goods from India because India was buying Russian oil, according to a later White House order. In a September 23, 2025 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Trump said, "China and India are the primary funders of the ongoing war by continuing to purchase Russian oil." He said European countries that still bought Russian energy "are funding the war against themselves" and "have to immediately cease all energy purchases from Russia," Ukrainska Pravda reported. The same day, after meeting Zelenskyy in New York, Trump called Russia a "paper tiger" and said Ukraine might win back its territory, Ukrainska Pravda reported.

On October 22, 2025, the White House canceled a planned Trump-Putin summit in Budapest, and the Treasury Department sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia's two largest oil companies. Bessent said the companies "fund the Kremlin's war machine." They were the first new sanctions Trump had imposed on Russia in his second term, the Kyiv Independent reported. Trump said, "we hope that they won't be on for long."

In November 2025, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff drafted a 28-point peace plan in coordination with Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev, the Kyiv Independent reported. Trump said he wanted Ukraine to agree by Thanksgiving. On November 25, he dropped that deadline and called the plan "just a map." Bloomberg had reported a recorded October 14 call in which Witkoff suggested to Putin aide Yuri Ushakov that they work together on a ceasefire plan. Asked about it, Trump said, "That's what a dealmaker does."

On February 6, 2026, Trump removed the 25 percent duty on Indian goods. His order said India "has committed to stop directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil." It directs the Commerce Department to monitor whether India resumes those imports and to recommend whether the duty should be reimposed if it does, according to the order.

March–June 2026: Waivers for Russian Oil at Sea

The U.S. war with Iran began on February 28, 2026, and oil prices rose as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted. On March 5, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a 30-day waiver that let Indian refiners buy Russian crude and petroleum products already loaded on ships, Euronews reported. It did not cover new shipments. Bessent called it a short-term fix that "will not provide significant financial benefit to the Russian government."

On March 12, Bessent extended the authorization to buyers worldwide, Euronews reported. The license, General License 134, covered Russian oil loaded on ships as of March 12 and allowed unloading until April 11, according to Euronews. On April 15, Bessent said, "We will not be renewing the general license on Russian oil and Iranian oil," The Tribune reported. Two days later, on April 17, Treasury issued a month-long extension for oil already at sea, The Moscow Times reported. On May 18, Treasury issued General License 134C, covering cargoes loaded on or before April 17 through June 17, World Oil reported. Bessent said the extension was for "the most vulnerable nations" and would reduce China's ability to stockpile discounted oil, The Tribune reported. An Indian petroleum ministry official said India had bought Russian oil "before waiver also, during waiver, and now also." Reports reviewed for this article did not show a further extension after June 17.

European leaders objected. On March 11, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, "This is not the moment to relax sanctions on Russia," Euronews reported. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said six of the seven G7 leaders agreed the move was not "the right signal to send." European Council President António Costa called it "very concerning, as it impacts European security." Hungary's Viktor Orbán was the only EU leader to call for lifting sanctions. On March 13, Zelenskyy said the waiver was "not the right decision" and that "This easing alone by the United States could provide Russia with about $10 billion for the war," Spectrum News reported. French President Emmanuel Macron said the waivers were "limited" and did not "broadly or permanently roll back the sanctions." After the April extension, Zelenskyy wrote that more than 110 tankers carrying over 12 million tonnes of Russian crude were at sea and that "Every dollar paid for Russian oil is money for the war," The Moscow Times reported.

The Graham Act

Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a close Trump ally and a longtime advocate of tougher sanctions on Russia, died unexpectedly in July 2026, shortly after returning from Ukraine, the Associated Press reported. Congress then passed a Russia sanctions package named for him with large bipartisan majorities. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) co-wrote the bill. Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) said it passed the Senate 86-11, according to NBC News. NBC reported that many Democrats opposed it because it gave the president new tariff powers.

Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 18, 2026, according to his later executive order. The law called for sanctions on Russian officials, banks, and the "shadow fleet" of tankers that moves Russian energy, the AP reported. It also called for a 500 percent duty on goods from Russia. It added 100 percent duties on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, and on the five countries that most help Russia evade oil sanctions. NBC reported that those buyers may include China and India. Section 115 of the law lets the president waive any of these measures by certifying to Congress that a waiver is in the national interest and sending a report explaining why.

On September 23, 2026, Rubio confirmed that Trump had invited Putin to the G20 summit in December at Trump National Doral in Miami, The New York Times reported. It would be Putin's first in-person G20 appearance since 2019. The G20 at Doral article covers Trump's choice of his own resort for the summit.

September 29: A Proposed Prisoners-for-Sanctions Plan

On September 29, The Atlantic's Simon Shuster reported that Trump had approved a proposal to ease sanctions on Russia in exchange for the release of political prisoners, Meduza reported. The idea came from John Coale, Trump's envoy to Belarus, who had used the same approach there, as described in the Belarus section below. Under Coale's plan, Russia could free prisoners in return for sanctions relief and renewed trade, without first ending its war in Ukraine. Coale said, "Economic ties usually result in normality." The plan was at an early stage, and no prisoners' names or U.S. concessions were made public.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he would try to "block" any lifting of sanctions before the war ends. Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said such deals encourage governments to arrest more people. On September 30, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the issue "was not discussed and could not be discussed, because we categorically deny the existence of any political prisoners," the Kyiv Independent reported. Human rights groups have documented many people imprisoned in Russia for political reasons. A bipartisan group of House members urged Trump on September 29 not to ease sanctions on Russia. The White House nominated Coale on September 28 to be special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, a post that requires Senate confirmation. As of October 23, no prisoners-for-sanctions deal with Russia had been announced.

October 9: The Diesel Announcement and Treasury License

On October 9, Trump posted on Truth Social that he had spoken with Putin and that Russia "will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace." He wrote that Russia would supply another 500,000 tons in November and 1,000,000 tons "immediately thereafter," and later 3,000,000 tons depending on the condition of its refineries. He said diesel prices would be "COMING DOWN, IN RECORD NUMBERS, AND FAST!" A Kremlin statement said Russia "confirmed its readiness to supply oil and petroleum products to the American and global markets," CBS News reported.

The same day, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 135. The license authorizes transactions related to the sale, delivery, offloading, and importation of Russian-origin diesel fuel, including into the United States. Those transactions would otherwise be barred by U.S. sanctions regulations on Russia. The license runs through April 7, 2027. It does not authorize debits to U.S. accounts held by Russia's central bank, National Wealth Fund, or Ministry of Finance.

Diesel averaged $6.28 a gallon on October 10, according to AAA data cited by CBS, up from $3.68 a year earlier. The record of $6.53 was set on September 22. Zelenskyy said in response, "Gifts to Putin will not bring peace or any benefit to the civilized world."

Responses to the Diesel Announcement

On the afternoon of October 9, 2026, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof quoted a post by Politico reporter Kyle Cheney summarizing Trump's announcement. Kristof wrote that the United States "punishes India for importing fuel from Russia and threatens 100% tariffs on other countries that do so," and asked why Trump was now announcing that the United States "is doing the same." When Kristof posted, the 25 percent duty on India had already been lifted in February on India's commitment to stop buying Russian oil. The Graham Act's 100 percent duties on the largest buyers of Russian energy had been law since September 18; Trump waived them a week later. As described below, no Russian diesel had reached the United States as of October 22.

On the evening of October 9, the advocacy group Razom for Ukraine posted a video clip of Trump saying, "If you're gonna win, you're gonna not buy oil from Russia." The group wrote that Trump "has long criticized buyers of Russian oil" and that "Today he decided to become one of them." On October 10, an editorial by the Indian news site ThePrint said the deal showed Trump's "chronic duplicity" after months in which he used tariff threats against India over its Russian oil purchases.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio had also called for ending Russian oil imports when he was a senator. On March 8, 2022, Rubio, then a Republican senator from Florida, wrote on X, "Stop importing Russian oil. Start producing more American oil again. That's the plan." The next month, the 2022 ban on Russian energy imports passed the Senate 100-0, according to Bloomberg. On October 9, 2026, Andrew Bates, a former senior deputy press secretary in the Biden White House, reposted Rubio's 2022 message with the comment, "Things are not going according to plan, @SecRubio." On October 17, Rubio defended the diesel arrangement. "That diesel is going to be sold one way or the other," he told reporters. "The only difference is how much of it the United States was going to get," Reuters reported.

October 10–15: Pressure on Ukraine and the "Energy Ceasefire"

On October 10, Trump told reporters at the White House that Zelenskyy "better damn well stop" Ukraine's drone strikes on Russian oil refineries, Al Jazeera and Reuters reported. Trump blames those strikes for high diesel prices. He added, "I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new president." Zelenskyy replied that "it's up to Ukrainians" to choose their leader. The same day, he said the diesel announcement had emboldened Russia, citing Russian glide-bomb strikes on residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia.

Also on October 10, Katie Zacharia, whom Trump had named White House press secretary the day before, defended the diesel deal on "Fox & Friends." She said the deal is "not actually deleterious toward bringing peace" and that "in fact, it works toward peace," the Daily Beast reported. She did not say how the deal would help end the war.

That evening, David Sacks, co-chair of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, wrote on X that Zelenskyy "is incapable of making peace" and that "elections in Ukraine are long overdue." Sacks had served as the White House AI and crypto czar until March 2026, when he moved to the advisory council, Crypto Briefing reported. His post quoted a March 2025 essay in which he argued that Zelenskyy has motives to avoid a peace deal, including that "he will lose power."

On October 11, Trump wrote on social media, "Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed." Zelenskyy said the announcement was "news to him," according to Axios, as cited by Al Jazeera. He said Ukraine would support such a truce if Russia also complied. That evening he reported Russian drone and glide-bomb strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including a power plant in Kharkiv. The Kremlin made no immediate statement on the claimed agreement. On October 12, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to give details about the energy truce and said only that "contacts are continuing," UNITED24 Media reported. The same day, he rejected Zelenskyy's separate offer to hold presidential elections during a 60-day ceasefire, saying that Putin and other officials "do not want a ceasefire," according to Reuters as cited by UNITED24.

On October 15, Ukraine struck an oil refinery in Russia's Ryazan region after Zelenskyy said a three-day pause in Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy sites had ended, The National News Desk reported, citing the AP. "The block [on attacking refineries] is out. We're done," Zelenskyy told the Financial Times. He said Russia had kept attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure during the pause. The Kremlin disputed that Ukraine had paused its strikes, and the AP said it could not independently verify either side's claims. Zelenskyy also said U.S. officials had warned that intelligence sharing could be cut off if the strikes continued. The dispute over restrictions on Ukraine's U.S.-controlled satellite communications during this period is covered in a separate article.

The October 11 announcement was the second energy truce Trump had announced in the war. After a phone call with Putin on March 18, 2025, the White House said the two leaders had agreed that a "movement to peace" would begin with an "energy and infrastructure ceasefire," NPR reported. The Kremlin said Putin had ordered a 30-day halt to strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Sacks, then the White House AI and crypto czar, wrote that day that Trump "has secured an energy and infrastructure ceasefire," calling it "the first deescalation in three years," according to a screenshot of his post that a critic circulated in reply to his October 10 post. That night, Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 145 drones and six missiles, and Zelenskyy said some struck energy facilities, CNN reported. Kremlin spokesman Peskov said Russia had called off strikes on energy targets and accused Ukraine of attacking a Russian oil depot. No formal agreement between Moscow and Kyiv was signed. Over the following month, the two governments disagreed on when the pause began and accused each other of repeated violations. On April 18, 2025, Peskov said "the month has indeed expired" and that Putin had issued no new instructions, the Kyiv Post reported.

October 13–15: Congressional Objections and Legal Questions

On October 13, a bipartisan group of 12 senators wrote to Trump urging him to withdraw from the diesel deal and rescind the Treasury license. The six Republican signers were Thom Tillis, Susan Collins (ME), Alan Armstrong (OK), Lisa Murkowski (AK), Mitch McConnell (KY), and John Cornyn (TX). The six Democrats were Richard Blumenthal, Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Dick Durbin (IL), Sheldon Whitehouse (RI), Jack Reed (RI), and Chris Coons (DE). They wrote that the deal "damages American security interests and is a betrayal of the people of Ukraine." They said it would "offer limited to no relief to Americans" while its revenue would "finance" Russia's war. They also urged Trump to use the authorities in the new Graham Act, which they said "require you to apply economic pressure on Russia." (He waived that law's measures on October 16.) On October 15, 22 House members sent a letter asking the administration to justify the deal under existing law, the Council on Foreign Relations reported.

CFR reported that lawmakers from both parties have questioned whether the deal is legal. Russian fuel imports have been banned since 2022, and a first-term law requires congressional review of significant changes to Russia sanctions.

Lawyers at the firm Clyde & Co wrote on October 13 that the 2022 Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act lets the president lift the ban on Russian diesel only by certifying to Congress that Russia has met conditions related to regional security and Ukrainian sovereignty, after consulting specified congressional committees. They said General License 135 sits in tension with that law and may face a legal challenge. They also noted that U.K. and EU bans on supplying and shipping Russian diesel remain in force, which limits which traders, shipowners, and insurers can take part in deliveries to the United States.

The 2022 law passed with nearly unanimous support. On October 9, the day of the diesel announcement, Peter Harrell, a former National Security Council official in the Biden administration, posted the law's first page and noted that it passed "100-0 in the Senate and 413-9 in the House." Both votes took place on April 7, 2022, according to Bloomberg, and President Biden signed the bill the next day as Public Law 117-109. The law bans imports of Russian oil, gas, coal, and other energy products, and sets no expiration date. Under Section 3, the president can end the ban only by certifying that Russia has reached an agreement, accepted by Ukraine's government, to withdraw its forces and stop hostilities; that it poses no immediate military threat to any NATO member; and that it recognizes Ukrainians' right to choose their own government. The president must consult four congressional committees at least 45 days before certifying. The ban ends 90 days after the certification, and Congress can block that by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. As of October 23, no such certification had been reported. The administration had not publicly explained how General License 135 fits with the 2022 law.

October 13: Trump Explains Why He Won't Call Putin a Dictator

Trump defended the diesel deal in an October 13 interview with Gray Television White House correspondent Jon Decker. Decker noted that Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) had called Putin a dictator and the leader of a mafia regime and had opposed the deal, and he asked Trump why Sullivan was wrong, Ukrainska Pravda reported. Trump said he avoids calling Putin a dictator because he needs to negotiate with him. "I have to make deals with people, so I don't go around calling them names. I'm a dealmaker," he said, according to Euronews. He said the diesel would be released to the world and would "bring down the price of diesel oil very substantially," according to Ukrainska Pravda.

Trump also said that "one of the reasons" the war began was that former President Joe Biden "went around mocking Russia," LIGA.net reported. He repeated his claim that the war would not have happened if the 2020 election had not been "rigged." That claim is false. Trump and his allies filed more than 60 lawsuits after the 2020 election, and only one succeeded, NBC News reported. That one ruling concerned a Pennsylvania mail-ballot deadline and did not change the result. On December 1, 2020, Trump's attorney general, William Barr, said the Justice Department had "not seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different outcome in the election," the AP reported. The AP also reported that judges, including Republican judges, had repeatedly dismissed the claims for lack of evidence.

Trump has applied that label to Ukraine's president. In a February 19, 2025 Truth Social post, the day after the U.S.-Russia talks in Riyadh, he called Zelenskyy "A Dictator without Elections" and wrote that he "better move fast or he is not going to have a Country left," European Pravda reported. Ukraine had delayed its 2024 elections because of Russia's invasion, the AP reported. On October 14, 2026, New York Times columnist David French wrote, in a post quoting the 2025 statement, that Trump "has forfeited the American president's role as leader of the free world."

Reports of Russian Aid to Iran

Critics of the diesel deal pointed to reports that Russia has helped Iran fight the United States. On October 12, Bulwark podcast host Tim Miller wrote that Russia had given Iran "satellite intelligence" along with "ammunition, drone components, and explosives." He asked why Trump's response was to pay Putin for diesel.

Those claims rest on reporting from earlier in the war. In March, The Washington Post reported, citing U.S. officials, that Russia had passed Iran the locations of U.S. warships and aircraft. The Kremlin denied it. That reporting and Trump's early response are covered in the Iran war article. On April 30, Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate hearing that Russia was aiding Iran's war effort, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing The Guardian. "There's definitely some action there," Caine said. He declined to give details in a public session. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), the committee chairman, said Russia "is taking serious action to undermine our efforts for success in Iran." On August 17, NBC News reported that Russia was shipping drone components, ammunition, and TNT to Iran across the Caspian Sea. NBC said the shipments were helping Iran replenish stockpiles damaged in U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Its source was a European government document verified by a Western official. The total volume of the shipments has not been disclosed, IBTimes reported. None of this reporting has tied a specific attack that killed U.S. service members to Russian intelligence or supplies.

Trump has disputed the reports. On October 12, he wrote on Truth Social that if Russia and China were helping Iran, "it's at a very low level, but I don't believe they are at all," AFP reported. "They have too much to lose, and we would know about it," he wrote. On October 18, after waiving the Graham Act sanctions, he wrote, "Russia is doing very little, if anything, to help the Islamic Republic of Iran, compared to what they could be doing, and I want to keep it that way, and will, unless stupid people get in the way," National Review reported. On October 19, he told reporters, "Russia has done very little for Iran." Hours earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had arrived in Tehran. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian thanked Lavrov for Russia's "support during the recent war," according to Iran International, as cited by National Review.

October 16: The Graham Act Waivers

Late on the evening of Friday, October 16, two days before the law's implementation deadline, the White House posted Executive Order 14436. The order formally sets the Graham Act's duties. It then waives all of them in Section 4(a). Sections 4(b) and 4(c) waive the law's sanctions provisions in sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), 103 through 111, and 117. The order says Trump sent Congress the required certification and report. The waivers remain in effect until the President or the Secretary of State decides that "further action is appropriate."

The order does not lift sanctions imposed before the Graham Act. Section 4(b) says nothing in the order affects sanctions under the executive orders issued for the national emergency on Russia's "harmful foreign activities," including on anyone already designated under them. The order also directs the U.S. Trade Representative to monitor countries' purchases of Russian oil and gas and report to the president.

The White House did not explain publicly why the waiver served the national interest, the AP reported. On October 17, Trump told reporters, "It's a very good decision, and it's going to be a decision that's good for the country." Rubio said Trump wants 60 days "to analyze their impact on the U.S. and global economy given the pressure on global energy supplies," NBC reported.

On October 18, Bessent told NBC's "Meet the Press" that "no sanctions were lifted on Friday." He said, "The only thing that has been lifted is the diesel embargo." The Graham Act's sanctions had not yet taken effect when they were waived, and the earlier sanctions remain. The diesel license, however, does authorize transactions that U.S. sanctions regulations otherwise prohibit. Bessent noted that the United Kingdom had waived its own embargo on diesel and jet fuel made from Russian crude in May.

Reaction to the Waivers

Blumenthal said, "These waivers have nothing to do with our national security, and everything to do with sucking up to Vladimir Putin," the AP reported. Several Republicans also objected, according to NBC. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) called the decision "a mistake." Tillis called it "Beyond irresponsible" and asked, "What part of enforcing a law passed 86-11 by the Senate does the President and his advisors not understand?" Representative Mike Lawler (R-NY) and Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK) said they disagreed with it. Representative Don Bacon (R-NE) said "the president is prolonging the war, not ending it." Cornyn wrote, "Lindsey would be appalled."

Senator Darline Graham (R-SC), the late senator's sister, was appointed to his seat and is running for a full term with Trump's endorsement. She said she disagreed with the decision, though "It's up to him whether he chooses to use" the law. Zelenskyy called the move "wrong" and said it "only helps the Russians."

Other lawmakers objected on October 17, the AP reported. Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) said, "it's not the first thing I would be doing." Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) said, "by giving the Russian economy life support, Trump's deal with the devil keeps getting dirtier." Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) said Trump was "thumbing his nose" at Congress and urged her colleagues to reverse the decision.

On October 19, 2026, Trump said he would meet Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss ending the war, possibly without Zelenskyy present, CNBC reported. "Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine. They haven't been doing much," he said. He added, "I think it's time for somebody else to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine." Trump said he is "not looking to break up negotiations" with Putin on Ukraine, Iran, diesel and the release of hostages. The same day, Tillis and Blumenthal said in a joint statement, "Trying to appease a murderous thug like Vladimir Putin will only prolong this war and bring greater casualties," CNBC reported.

What Congress Can Do

On October 16, Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced legislation to block the diesel deal, the AP reported. Meeks had led opposition to the Graham bill and warned at the time that Trump would not follow it. The House and Senate are in recess until after the November 3 election. The AP reported that Congress is unlikely to be in a position to challenge the waiver until lawmakers return to Washington.

Announced Supplies, Not Yet Deliveries

As of October 22, no Russian diesel shipped under the arrangement had reached the United States. On October 21, S&P Global reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the first U.S.-bound diesel tanker, about 40,000 metric tons, would leave Russia's Baltic coast on October 22. That would be the first such shipment to the United States since January 2022. Novak said Russia was ready to supply 300,000 metric tons in October and 500,000 in November, within the limits of refineries damaged by Ukrainian attacks. Novak said the supply contract was "at the final stage." The same day, Putin told Witkoff that "the first tanker will leave in 2-3 days," which would push the departure to about October 23 or 24, the Kyiv Post reported. Putin also said "the financial component should be provided" before deliveries, according to Reuters. No vessel or loading port had been named.

On October 9, Politico reporter Kyle Cheney posted a screenshot of Trump's Truth Social post with the summary "The United States is now importing fuel from Russia, per President Trump." Trump's post described supplies Russia had agreed to provide to "the American and Global Marketplace," not deliveries already made. As of October 21, Russian officials said the supply contract was still being finalized, and no departure of a U.S.-bound cargo had been reported.

Putin told Witkoff on October 21 that international prices fell 5 to 6 percent after the announcement, according to a Kremlin transcript cited by S&P Global. Benchmark prices did not reflect a sustained drop. S&P reported that ICE Low Sulfur Gasoil futures settled at $1,449.50 per metric ton on October 20, up from $1,420.75 on October 9, near September's record. Analysts cited by CFR said the volumes are small next to a global supply shortfall that the analytics firm Kpler estimates at about 130,000 tons a day. "The amount of diesel Russia can provide would be a drop in the bucket compared to global demand," Masha Kotkin of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told S&P Global.

Estimates of Russian Revenue

The administration has not disclosed what buyers will pay for the Russian diesel, so estimates of Russia's earnings vary widely. Newsweek reported on October 13 that "some initial estimates" put the deal's value to Russia's economy at roughly $4 billion, and quoted lower figures from economists. Eric Golson, an economist at the University of Surrey who studies economic warfare, estimated $400 million to $1 billion in additional revenue over the first six months. Golson said the money would help Putin "prop-up his ailing economy" and buy weapons used in Ukraine. Alexander Kolyandr of the Eurasia Group consultancy estimated that Russia would gain about $100 million in hard currency in the first six months. He called that "peanuts" next to Russia's defense spending, which its draft 2027 budget sets at more than $202 billion.

On October 19, an OilPrice.com analysis by Simon Watkins calculated that the 1.8 million tons Trump announced for October, November, and after would bring Russia about $2.8 billion at current wholesale prices with no discount. Adding the conditional 3 million tons would raise the total to just over $7 billion. These figures assume every announced shipment is completed. As of October 22, none of the diesel had reached the United States.

Lukoil's Foreign Assets and Business Deals Around the Talks

After OFAC sanctioned Lukoil on October 22, 2025, the company said it would sell its foreign assets, which Interfax put at about $20 billion, Interfax reported. They include oil projects in Iraq, Cameroon, and other countries, refineries in Bulgaria, Romania, and the Netherlands, and about 2,500 gas stations in 19 countries. Two earlier buyers did not win U.S. approval. Treasury rejected a deal with the commodities trader Gunvor. An agreement with the U.S. investment firm Carlyle, signed in late January 2026, expired at the end of July without OFAC approval.

On October 3, 2026, The New York Times reported that the Trump administration's talks with Russia on ending the war in Ukraine had expanded to include a multibillion-dollar sale of Lukoil's oil fields, refineries, and gas stations outside Russia, according to Reuters. The Times said Putin raised the deal with envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, at a September 5 meeting in the Kremlin. One person familiar with the meeting said Putin presented it as a way to show Russians they could do business with the United States. The Americans said they would work on it, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing the Times. They saw it as a chance to improve relations with the Kremlin and lower energy prices.

The leading bidders include U.S. investor Todd Boehly, who has given $2 million to Trump's political causes, an arm of the U.S. government, and two Middle Eastern groups that have done business with Kushner's or Witkoff's families, the Times reported. The Financial Times later reported that Boehly's group includes the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, which would take a stake of about 15 percent, according to Interfax. It also includes Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE's national security adviser, and the Al-Khayyat family, whose role in Syria is described in the Syria section below. A Tahnoon-linked company bought a 49 percent stake in World Liberty Financial, the crypto venture founded by the Trump and Witkoff families, as covered in a separate article. U.S. approval would lift American sanctions from the assets and raise their value right away, the Times reported.

The Times said there is no evidence that Kushner or Witkoff would profit personally. A Witkoff spokeswoman said he "has no conflict of interest and no financial stake in this matter." The White House, Treasury, and Lukoil did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment. A senior administration official said in a statement that Witkoff and Kushner had helped negotiate the financial terms of the government's stake, which the official said include "a substantial upfront payment and profits interest for the United States," IBTimes reported, citing the Times.

The report came one day after Kushner wrote on X on October 2 that "misleading stories will not distract me from the work President Trump asked me to do." That post answered a separate CNN report on his firm's stake in an Israeli financial company, covered in the Gaza ceasefire article. On October 3, Kirill Dmitriev, Putin's special envoy and head of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, replied to Kushner's post: "Jared is a Peacemaker. Peacemakers get attacked for peacemaking because warmongers lavishly fund those attacks," the Daily Beast reported.

Some critics have linked the Lukoil proposal to the diesel deal. On October 10, Atlantic staff writer David Frum argued in an opinion column that the diesel deal would do little for American consumers. He estimated that the initial 300,000 tons equal about 2.25 million barrels, or roughly 16 hours of U.S. diesel consumption. Frum wrote that the deal instead offered people around Trump "corruption opportunities on a multibillion-dollar scale." He tied it to Russian business proposals made to Witkoff and Kushner, including the Lukoil sale. Frum argued that Russian energy assets lose value when Ukrainian drones strike them. In his view, this creates an "implicit quid pro quo": Russia would reward Trump's associates if they pushed Ukraine to give up. That is Frum's interpretation. No investigation has found such an exchange. On October 11, Jonathan Lemire, an Atlantic staff writer and co-host of MSNOW's "Morning Joe," quoted that passage on X.

Separately, The New Yorker reported on September 14, 2026 on a classified, undated report by a European intelligence agency. The report says Trump and people around him have discussed several potential business contracts in Russia, and it lists ten possible ventures. They include reopening the Nord Stream 2 pipeline under American control, resuming ExxonMobil's operations on Sakhalin, and drilling for oil in the Sea of Okhotsk. The report names Trump, Witkoff, Kushner, former presidential envoy Richard Grenell, and Gentry Beach, a friend of Donald Trump Jr., as people who might take part. The European official who gave the document to the magazine said the deals "would be executed the moment Trump delivers a peace deal." These are prospective deals described by a foreign intelligence service, not completed transactions. A Kushner spokesman denied that U.S. officials would profit from the deals under discussion, and Grenell denied any wrongdoing.

As of October 21, no sale had been approved. That day, OFAC extended until November 21 a license that allows negotiations and conditional agreements for the sale of Lukoil International GmbH, Interfax reported. Any actual transaction still requires separate OFAC approval.

Belarus

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has ruled Belarus for more than three decades. The United States increased sanctions on Belarus in 2021, after his government cracked down on mass protests over the disputed 2020 presidential election, Al Jazeera reported. Tens of thousands of people were detained in that crackdown, the Associated Press reported. Belarus faced more Western sanctions after it let Russia use its territory to invade Ukraine in 2022. Those sanctions targeted the state potash producer Belaruskali. They also cut off Belarus's main export route through Lithuania's port of Klaipeda, the AP reported. Potash is a key fertilizer. Before the sanctions, Belarus supplied about 20 percent of global potash exports.

2025: First Releases and the National Airline

On June 21, 2025, Belarus freed opposition figure Siarhei Tsikhanouski, the husband of opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, shortly after Lukashenko met Trump's Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, in Minsk, the Kyiv Independent reported. Kellogg was the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Belarus in years. Kellogg's deputy, John Coale, wrote, "President Trump's strong leadership led to the release of 14 prisoners from Belarus today." Tsikhanouskaya said "1,150 political prisoners remain behind bars."

On September 11, 2025, Belarus freed 52 political prisoners, and the United States eased some sanctions on the national airline Belavia, NBC News reported. A U.S. official said the airline could now service its planes and buy parts, including for Boeing aircraft. The United States, the European Union and others had sanctioned Belavia after Belarusian flight controllers ordered a Greece-to-Lithuania jet to land in Minsk, where authorities arrested journalist Raman Pratasevich. Those freed included Ihar Losik, a journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Tsikhanouskaya said, "We understand that this is part of the deal." She warned that lifting sanctions "without systemic changes in the country could open loopholes" for Lukashenko's government and Russia.

Potash Sanctions Lifted for Prisoner Releases

Trump appointed Coale as special envoy to lead talks with Belarus. On December 13, 2025, after two days of talks in Minsk, Belarus freed 123 prisoners, the AP reported. They included Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, 2020 protest leader Maria Kolesnikova, and Viktar Babaryka, who had tried to run for president in 2020. Coale announced that the United States was lifting sanctions on Belarus's potash sector. He said the relationship was moving from "baby steps to more confident steps." Tsikhanouskaya said Lukashenko "hasn't changed his policies" and urged caution on sanctions relief.

On March 19, 2026, Lukashenko ordered the release of 250 political prisoners after meeting Coale in Minsk, the AP reported. It was the largest single release of political prisoners in Belarus's history. Coale called it "a significant humanitarian milestone." He said the United States would lift sanctions on two state banks and the Finance Ministry. Just before the release, the Belarusian rights group Viasna estimated that more than 1,100 political prisoners remained in the country. On March 26, OFAC removed Belaruskali and its trading arm, the Belarusian Potash Company, from its sanctions list, Reform.news reported. OFAC also authorized transactions with Belinvestbank and lifted restrictions on the Belarusian Finance Ministry and Development Bank. The European Union has kept its own ban on Belarusian potash imports, Euronews reported.

On September 16, 2026, Belarus freed 25 political prisoners as the United States lifted sanctions on two companies, the paint maker Lakokraska and the state forestry, pulp and paper group Bellesbumprom, Al Jazeera reported. The day before, Coale told Lukashenko that U.S. banks would return tens of millions of dollars in frozen Belarusian assets. Coale said Trump's "commitment to direct diplomacy delivers results" and said he hoped to return in about a month and see "hundreds" freed. Tsikhanouskaya said Lukashenko "does not want to release all political prisoners." EU spokesperson Christian Wigand welcomed the step and wrote that "800+ individuals remain arbitrarily detained in appalling conditions." On September 24, Lukashenko pardoned 15 more prisoners, Reuters reported. Viasna said 883 political prisoners remained. Analysts told Reuters that Lukashenko was taking a harder line in the talks because the EU had not matched the U.S. relief on potash.

The Potash Deal Proposal and the First Shipment

On September 21, 2026, during a U.S. trade dispute with Canada, Trump posted on Truth Social that "The United States is working on a massive Deal with respect to the purchase of Potash from Belarus," the Kyiv Independent reported. He wrote that the price would be "substantially less than we are currently paying to Canada," Euronews reported. The United States imports nearly 85 percent of its potash from Canada, all of it mined in Saskatchewan, CTV News reported. CTV reported that Canadian potash has been exempt from Trump's tariffs on Canada. Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe said the plan was "wrong and it doesn't make sense." He called Belarusian potash "blood potash." Lukashenko said Belarus could not supply large volumes to the United States. "We simply do not have those volumes — everything is contracted," he said, according to Al Jazeera.

On September 22, at a meeting with Zelenskyy at the UN General Assembly, Trump said, "We'll continue to go with Canada, but Belarus would like to sell it for a much lower price," The Canadian Press reported. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said Canada would keep supplying the United States. The Canadian Press reported that industry leaders and economists questioned how Belarusian potash could be cheaper when Canada is closer and has established supply routes.

A 30,000-tonne cargo from the Belarusian Potash Company was due at the Port of New Orleans by mid-October, The Logic reported, citing the Financial Times. It was the first Belarusian potash shipment to the United States in four years, Al Jazeera reported, citing ship-tracking data from Kpler. The cargo was loaded at the Russian port of Bronka near St. Petersburg. Belarus is landlocked, and EU restrictions push its exports through Russia. The shipment is a small fraction of the 5.6 million tonnes of potash the United States imported last year. Al Jazeera reported that Trump is concerned higher costs for farmers could cost Republicans votes in the midterm elections. Tsikhanouskaya told AFP in September that this is not the time to trade with Lukashenko's government. She said potash income funds repression and Russia's war.

On October 10, after the Russian diesel announcement, Daniel Hannan, a British Conservative member of the House of Lords, wrote that Trump "is buying diesel from Russia, potash from Belarus, minerals from China," all to avoid buying from Canada.

Syria

Rebels led by Ahmed al-Sharaa overthrew Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Syria had been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1979 and was subject to broad U.S. sanctions, Al Jazeera reported. Over the next 20 months, the Trump administration and Congress removed nearly all of them.

May 2025–August 2026: From Announcement to Terrorism-List Removal

On May 13, 2025, in a speech in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Trump said the United States would cease sanctions on Syria "to give them a chance at greatness," NBC News reported. With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the audience, Trump said, "Oh, what I do for the crown prince." He met al-Sharaa in Riyadh the next day. On May 23, Treasury issued General License 25, which authorized transactions with Syria's interim government, central bank, and state-owned companies, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a 180-day waiver of Caesar Act sanctions, Reuters reported. Rubio called it "the first step in delivering on the President's vision of a new relationship." The White House said Syria had been asked to tell foreign militants to leave, deport what it called Palestinian terrorists, and help the United States prevent an ISIS resurgence.

On June 30, 2025, Trump signed an executive order ending the Syria sanctions program, effective July 1, the law firm Holland & Knight reported. The order revoked six earlier executive orders and removed 518 individuals and entities from the sanctions list. It kept sanctions on 139 people and entities, mostly linked to Assad's government. In July 2025, the State Department revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group al-Sharaa had led, the law firm Arnold & Porter reported.

On November 7, 2025, Treasury removed al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab from its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, a day after the UN Security Council removed them from its own sanctions list, Al Jazeera reported. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz said the council was "sending a strong political signal that recognises Syria is in a new era." Al-Sharaa visited the White House on November 10, the first Syrian president to do so. Trump had temporarily suspended the Caesar Act through 180-day waivers in May and November 2025. Congress repealed it in December 2025, as described below.

On July 2, 2026, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Representative Joe Wilson (R-SC) asked Rubio to remove Syria from the state sponsors list, JNS reported. They wrote that the designation "represents the most significant remaining legal impediment to Syria's reconstruction." Trump notified Congress on July 8 that he intended to rescind it. On August 24, after a 45-day review period, the State Department removed Syria from the list and revoked HTS's designation as a global terrorist group, Al Jazeera reported. Rubio said the action was "taken in recognition of the positive actions taken and further commitments" by al-Sharaa's government. Bessent said it "will help foster additional investment in Syria." Al-Sharaa called the decision "historic." OFAC also removed HTS from its sanctions list and revoked General License 25, which it judged no longer necessary, the law firm Baker McKenzie reported. Only Cuba, Iran and North Korea remain on the list.

The Caesar Act Repeal

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 sanctioned foreign persons providing significant support to the Syrian government and specifically mandated sanctions on those engaging in Syrian reconstruction activities. International banks would not commit capital to reconstruction projects while the sanctions could be "snapped back" into place. Only Congress could repeal the statutory sanctions permanently. Shaheen and Wilson led the repeal effort, with Wilson introducing standalone repeal legislation (H.R. 3941) in June 2025.

The final repeal was inserted into the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, a nearly $1 trillion must-pass defense bill. The Senate passed the NDAA 77-20 on December 17, 2025, and Trump signed it on December 18, 2025. The repeal language included a requirement that the President report every 180 days for four years on Syria's progress on issues including cooperation against ISIS, protection of minorities, and cessation of support for terrorist groups.

The Khayyat Family and the Lobbying Campaign

On April 19, 2026, The New York Times published an investigation by reporter Eric Lipton documenting how the Syrian-born Al-Khayyat family, billionaire investors based in Qatar, pursued proposed Trump-family business deals while lobbying Congress to permanently repeal U.S. sanctions on Syria. The family was pursuing more than $12 billion in reconstruction contracts. According to the Times, Mohamad Al-Khayyat pitched a coastal development including a Trump-branded golf course to Republican lawmakers after Wilson told him in a 2025 meeting: "I know how to get the president's attention. Make it a Trump National Golf Course in Syria." At the same time, Mohamad's older brothers were negotiating a partnership with Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump to help finance a multibillion-dollar resort in Albania.

The White House and the Trump Organization told the Times they were not aware of the proposed Syria golf resort, and the Trump Organization said no discussions were underway. The Khayyat family also told the Times their partnership with Kushner was unrelated to the sanctions repeal effort. White House counsel David Warrington said: "President Trump performs his constitutional duties in an ethically sound manner and to suggest otherwise is either ill-informed or malicious."

According to the Times, after Assad's fall, the Khayyat family quickly assembled a large portfolio of contracts with the new Syrian government led by al-Sharaa:

  • A $4 billion deal to rebuild Damascus International Airport into a Middle Eastern hub
  • A $7 billion contract to build four natural gas-powered electric plants
  • A deal to partner with U.S.-based Chevron to develop offshore natural gas drilling in the Mediterranean
  • Purchases of historic homes in Damascus's old city (a UNESCO World Heritage site) for a planned tourist destination
  • A coastal resort project near Latakia where the proposed Trump golf course would be built

Thomas J. Barrack Jr., Trump's special envoy to Syria, appeared alongside the Khayyats at announcements for each of these projects, the Times reported, signaling Trump administration support. The deals all depended on permanent repeal of the Caesar Act.

The Khayyats had previously built their fortune in Qatar, where they developed close ties to the royal family and built an artificial island filled with restaurants for the 2022 World Cup, including a Carbone Doha location where Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner dined during the tournament. That dinner began the relationship between the two families.

According to the Times, the Khayyats' lobbying effort in Washington was coordinated substantially by Tarek Naemo, a Florida-based Syrian-American businessman and lifelong friend of Mohamad Al-Khayyat who acknowledged to the Times that he was working on the proposed Trump golf course project. Naemo and his wife "began to court at least a dozen members of Congress, starting with Speaker Mike Johnson," with the help of a series of campaign contributions.

Developments the Times documented:

  • Inauguration access: Ramez and Moutaz Al-Khayyat attended Trump's January 2025 inauguration events, including a candlelight dinner that "generally required a minimum donation of $250,000 for a pair of tickets." They told the Times they had not paid for the invitation
  • Social access to Wilson: Naemo became a social partner of Wilson, joining him to shoot skeet, meeting him at the Omni Homestead Resort in Virginia, and attending a Kennedy Center performance of "Les Misérables" with Wilson and Trump
  • The "foundation stone": Mohamad Al-Khayyat presented Wilson with a framed stone emblazoned "Trump International Golf Club, Syria" to deliver to the White House

Representative Brian Mast's Reversal

The main remaining obstacle to repeal was Representative Brian Mast (R-FL), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who was concerned about protection of ethnic and religious minorities in post-Assad Syria.

According to the Times, the standoff came to a head on November 9, 2025, the night before al-Sharaa's White House meeting with Trump. At a dinner at the St. Regis Hotel attended by Mast, Wilson, and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), al-Sharaa (who had been a member of Al-Qaeda in Iraq two decades earlier) addressed Mast's concerns directly. A second late-night meeting that included Mohamad Al-Khayyat and Tarek Naemo was quickly arranged. By the end of that evening, Mast had dropped his demand for a snap-back provision. Blumenthal told the Times that "no mention was made of the tie-ins to Trump family deals" at the dinner. Aides to Mast said the Trump family tie-ins were not a factor in his decision.

In remarks on the House floor, Mast stated: "We're giving Syria a chance to chart a post-Assad future."

The Kushner-Khayyat Albania Partnership

The Times reported that during the same period as the sanctions lobbying, the relationship between the Khayyats and Jared Kushner deepened. What had initially been a construction-firm role for the Khayyats on Kushner's multibillion-dollar Albanian seaside resort evolved into a joint venture partnership. Ramez Al-Khayyat told the Times: "We are investing in the holding in order to make sure that there is sufficient capital. So it's a joint venture between the two companies, and actually we are managing it together." Ivanka Trump traveled to Albania in January 2026 to meet with Ramez Al-Khayyat and discuss designs. A spokesman for Kushner declined to comment.

The project's approvals rest on rules that Prime Minister Edi Rama's government changed in 2024. That year, Albania's parliament amended the protected areas law (Law No. 21/2024). The Guardian reported that the law lets "strategic investors" build in parts of the Vjosa-Narta landscape. In September 2024, a government decision removed the internal zoning of the Pishë Poro–Narta protected landscape at Zvërnec. Before the decision, about 43 percent of the area had the highest level of protection. Afterward, none did, and tourism construction became possible with approval from the National Council for Territory (KKTU), which Rama chairs, Citizens.al reported. Zvërnec South Adriatic Development, the company developing the site, was registered in August 2024. It is owned through Dutch shell entities. It received KKTU development permits less than eight months later, Balkan Insight reported, even though ownership of some of the land was still being disputed in court. According to a later court petition by Albanian environmental groups, the KKTU issued a development permit on March 30, 2026, and approved fencing and access-road work on April 29. The groups said, citing the environment minister, that the developer applied for an environmental impact assessment only on May 5. Field checks cited in the petition found about 8 kilometers of new road, a bridge over a canal, and about 2.8 hectares of cleared dunes and pine forest. Prosecutors opened a criminal case for illegal construction and habitat damage. The work was then suspended pending a fuller environmental assessment. Separately, in December 2024 Rama's government granted strategic-investor status to Atlantic Incubation Partners, a Kushner-linked company, for a resort on nearby Sazan Island, the Tirana Times reported. Protests against the project began in late May 2026. In June, Rama told the German news agency dpa that exploratory work had been paused because of the "pressure" and that no construction applications had been filed. He said the project would still go ahead. Also in June, the European Parliament called on Albania to repeal the 2024 law, calling environmental standards "non-negotiable conditions of accession" to the EU, the Guardian reported. Rama's office told Balkan Insight that the KKTU cannot verify property deeds and that pending land disputes have "no connection whatsoever" with permit reviews.

On September 14, 2026, The New Yorker reported that in April 2026 a company developing Kushner's Albanian project paid Albanian businessman Artur Shehu $125 million for land at Zvërnec. Two months later, Albanian prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for Shehu on suspicion of drug trafficking and money laundering. In court filings, they said the land in the development was "suspected of having been illegally acquired through forgeries." Shehu denied all accusations. The magazine reported that the project may have to be halted if the court rules for the prosecutors.

On September 25, 2026, four Albanian groups (the Albanian Ornithological Society, EcoAlbania, REC Albania and the Res Publica Center) asked Albania's Constitutional Court to annul the 2024 zoning decision and suspend it while the case is heard, Citizens.al reported. The court had dismissed opposition lawmakers' challenge to the 2024 law in July 2025. On October 8, Kushner issued his first detailed public statement on the project, in response to the New Yorker. He said his partners bought the Zvërnec land in a private transaction for €230 million after lawyers verified the title. He described himself as a minority partner and named Ramez and Moutaz Alkhayyat as partners. He said the Albanian Kastrati family first brought him the opportunity. He also said the project still needs all required Albanian regulatory and environmental approvals, the Tirana Times reported. The Guardian quoted the statement as saying the goal was to leave the area "greener, more biodiverse and environmentally stronger."

On October 19, 2026, the Guardian reported that Tineke Strik, a Dutch Green member of the European Parliament who led a parliamentary fact-finding mission to Albania in June, accused Rama's government of fast-tracking the project. Her main target was the environmental impact assessment that Rama has said will decide whether the roughly €4 billion project goes ahead. Strik called it a "fast-track impact assessment" and said a fuller study "could never lead to the conclusion that this construction is allowed." She said the government had sent an environmental package to the European Commission without repealing the 2024 law. She also said the government was trying to finish its procedures before Albania becomes legally bound by EU standards. Aleksander Trajce of the Albanian conservation group PPNEA told the Guardian that a proper assessment would take "at least two years." Rama has said the project's fate will be decided "not in the streets but by science." Asked about Strik's claims, he told the Guardian she was "imagining environmental plots that do not exist" and should instead condemn violence at the protests. By October, those protests had become student-led clashes with police in Tirana, and protesters were demanding Rama's resignation, which he has refused. The Guardian report did not include comment from the Khayyat family. The allegation that the review is being rushed comes from Strik and environmental groups. No court or EU body has ruled on it.

Impact on Syrians at the Proposed Golf Course Site

The Times reported that the proposed Syrian coastal resort is planned for farmland near Latakia in a region where many residents are Alawites, the religious minority that includes the Assad family and whose members were targeted in massacres by vigilantes after Assad's fall. Local farmer Sinan Younis, 42, told the Times that his extended family of about two dozen people derive their only income from land they farm but do not own. "What about us?" he asked. "How could they take all this, for a reason like that? Why our land, the land that we live from?"

Remaining Concerns

The Times noted that Mast and other members of Congress remain concerned that Syria has not lived up to expectations, citing continued sectarian violence against minorities, but "the leverage the United States had—the power to snap back the sanctions—is now gone."

Bosnia: Sanctions Relief for Milorad Dodik

The October 2025 Delisting

Milorad Dodik is the nationalist leader of Bosnia's Serbs and has close ties to Putin. He was first sanctioned in 2017 for obstructing the U.S.-brokered Dayton peace agreement, OCCRP reported. In 2023, the Biden administration extended sanctions to his children and family-linked companies. The Biden Treasury accused Dodik of abusing public office "to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption," The Guardian reported. Dodik called the sanctions "lies." In 2025, a Bosnian court barred him from politics for six years and sentenced him to one year in prison for defying the international envoy overseeing the peace accord, and he was stripped of his office as president of Republika Srpska, the Serb-run entity.

After Trump returned to office, Dodik launched a multimillion-dollar lobbying campaign to have the sanctions lifted. One of the lobbyists was Michael Flynn, Trump's former national security adviser, who earned $100,000 for a month's work, the Guardian reported. Lobbyist Marc Zell represented Dodik's government, and Rudy Giuliani and Rod Blagojevich advocated on Dodik's behalf, OCCRP reported. In October 2025, about two weeks before the delisting, Republika Srpska's lawmakers annulled a series of separatist laws passed after Dodik's indictment, the Cyprus Mail reported. OCCRP reported that officials in Sarajevo saw this as part of a deal with Washington.

On October 29, 2025, OFAC removed Dodik, his son and daughter, and dozens of allies and companies from its sanctions list without explanation, OCCRP reported. The day before, Dodik had met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The State Department welcomed the annulled laws and credited U.S.-led efforts "to defuse the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Cyprus Mail reported. Dodik thanked Trump on X for "correcting the great injustice done to Republika Srpska." Shaheen called the delisting "reckless and premature," citing Dodik's undermining of the Dayton agreement, his ties to Putin, and corruption. Bosnian Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković said Washington was rewarding Dodik and his allies for keeping their part of a bargain and that the sanctions could be reimposed.

A No-Bid Pipeline

On May 30, 2026, The Guardian published an investigation by reporter Tom Burgis examining how AAFS Infrastructure and Energy, a firm with no record of comparable projects, was positioned to win contracts worth more than $1 billion to build and operate a gas pipeline across the Balkans. The pipeline, the Southern Interconnection, would connect Bosnia to a liquefied-natural-gas terminal on Croatia's island of Krk, allowing U.S.-shipped gas to replace Russian supplies. Reducing the Balkans' dependence on Russian energy has been a stated U.S. objective across three administrations, and the State Department describes the project as a longstanding priority.

What distinguished AAFS was its personal connections to Trump. The company's director is Jesse Binnall, a lawyer who represented Trump and Donald Trump Jr. in political cases, including defending them against a lawsuit tied to the January 6 Capitol attack. After Trump returned to power, Binnall secured a $1.25 million Justice Department settlement for Michael Flynn. AAFS's vice president is Joe Flynn, Michael Flynn's brother and, like Binnall, a participant in the 2020 effort to overturn Joe Biden's election victory. The Guardian described the two men's qualifications for a Balkans infrastructure venture as "not immediately apparent."

The company, registered in Sarajevo in November 2025 and wholly owned by a U.S. entity of the same name, initially discussed a $300 million airport renovation with Bosnian officials before being steered toward the far larger pipeline. In March 2026, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosniak-Croat entity that is one of the country's two halves, passed legislation designating AAFS as the pipeline's developer, removing the state-owned company BH-Gas that had previously held the role. There was no competitive tender, the customary mechanism for ensuring a contract goes to a capable bidder at a fair price. On April 15, 2026, the Federation's upper house gave final approval to the project, estimated at about $1.5 billion; AAFS has said it intends to invest roughly $1.8 billion across the pipeline, gas-fired power plants, and airport concessions.

Transparency International warned that awarding such a strategic project without a tender, "in a country with one of the highest levels of corruption in Europe," could have "catastrophic consequences." The EU's ambassador to Bosnia, Luigi Soreca, privately warned Bosnian leaders in April that the project-specific legislation could jeopardize the country's EU accession path and more than €1 billion in EU funding. A confidential AAFS proposal seen by the Guardian put the pipeline at €300 million, with another €900 million for three power plants, financed by equity and debt rather than the Bosnian state; the documents did not specify what returns the company's principals expected.

The various dollar and euro figures reported for the venture describe different scopes rather than conflicting estimates. The Guardian's "worth more than $1 billion" and its €300 million (pipeline) plus €900 million (three power plants) breakdown, roughly €1.2 billion combined, cover the pipeline-and-power-plant package. The "roughly $1.5 billion" project estimate and the "$1.8 billion" AAFS investment figure additionally fold in the airport concessions and reflect the full concession package rather than the pipeline alone. Read against the scope each source is measuring, the numbers are consistent.

The project's completion depends on Dodik, whose entity could veto the pipeline and across whose territory the existing Russian-gas pipeline runs. On April 7, 2026, Donald Trump Jr., the custodian of the family business empire, traveled to Banja Luka, the main city of the Serb entity, for an event in his honor. There he praised the benefits of buying American gas ("That's a no-brainer") without mentioning AAFS or the pipeline directly. On April 21, shortly after the visit, Dodik indicated he would not obstruct the project.

Trump's Political Advisers Paid by Republika Srpska

On October 6, 2026, The New York Times reported that James Blair and Chris LaCivita, two of Trump's top political advisers, had each been paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, according to people cited by the Times, through a Washington law firm retained by the government of Republika Srpska. The Times said the work was advice on voting issues ahead of the entity's October 4 elections, the Denver Gazette reported. The two traveled to Republika Srpska before the vote, Al Jazeera reported. Blair is a former White House deputy chief of staff who now runs MAGA Inc., Trump's main super PAC, and leads meetings with White House chief of staff Susie Wiles on the president's midterm strategy. LaCivita, Trump's 2024 co-campaign manager, is a senior adviser to the group, Raw Story reported, citing the Times. Neither man is a current White House employee, and neither commented on the visit, according to Al Jazeera.

The payments fit a wider pattern of spending. According to Justice Department filings cited by the Times and Al Jazeera, Republika Srpska's government has paid more than $4 million since the start of 2025 to lobbyists and political operatives linked to Trump. On September 25, 2026, Bosnia's Constitutional Court ruled that Republika Srpska's lobbying activities violated the country's constitution because their goals ran against the constitution and the decisions of Bosnia's state institutions, Al Jazeera reported. Dodik's party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), won the October 4 regional vote with more than 55 percent, although Dodik himself was barred from running after his 2025 conviction. Five days before the vote, Dodik met Putin in Moscow. On election night he told supporters, "If it had not been for Trump's magnificent victory, we would probably be political corpses today."

On October 7, Trump wrote on Truth Social that Blair and LaCivita "are outside consultants" who "do not work for me," and that "if there's a conflict, I will terminate them, immediately!" Later, in the Oval Office, he told reporters there was no conflict of interest because the two were not White House employees and, as consultants, could have other clients, Al Jazeera reported. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon called the two men "grifters" and told Politico, "We need a forensic audit of where the money went." A White House ally said Blair had been "working quite literally around the clock" on the midterms. LaCivita's firm was separately paid $1.6 million by Albania's opposition to advise former Albanian leader Sali Berisha's campaign, the Times previously reported. The Trump administration lifted a U.S. travel ban on Berisha in June 2026, as it had lifted sanctions on Dodik. Aleksandar Trifunovic, editor of the Banja Luka magazine Buka, told Al Jazeera that what Dodik paid for "was proximity to Trump through Trump's people." The reports cited here do not allege that the advisers' work changed a specific U.S. policy decision.

The Chief of Staff's Daughter and Republika Srpska's Lobbying Firm

On October 8, 2026, the Financial Times and CBS News reported that Katie Wiles, the daughter of White House chief of staff Susie Wiles, is a partner at Continental Strategy, a Washington lobbying firm. Continental registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act in early 2026 to represent Republika Srpska, according to filings reviewed by CBS. Srpska's government began paying the firm $35,000 a month in February, according to Justice Department filings cited by The New York Times.

CBS verified a photo, taken in Republika Srpska and posted to Katie Wiles's Instagram, that shows her holding a rifle beside Željko Budimir, the entity's interior minister. Continental said she spent two days there in mid-August on behalf of a U.S. company invited to do a feasibility study. On October 15, the Times identified that company as TXC Energy LLC, a Texas firm run by energy executive John V. Calce. According to people cited by the Times, Continental arranged Calce's visit at the Srpska government's request so he could explore a partnership on a pipeline carrying natural gas from Croatia into the Western Balkans. The Times said it was unclear whether he was still pursuing the project. Donald Trump Jr. owns a minority stake in America First Refining, another company Calce leads, according to people cited by the Times.

Continental said Katie Wiles does not lobby the U.S. government for any client and has not spoken with any U.S. official about Republika Srpska. The firm said its partner Alejandro Garcia, a former deputy political director of Trump's campaign, is the only team member who has dealt with the U.S. government on the account. Garcia arranged a September White House meeting between Susie Wiles and Željka Cvijanović, a close Dodik ally, CBS reported. A White House official said Katie Wiles had no role in that meeting and that Susie Wiles "does not discuss work matters with her daughters." Garcia also recommended Blair and LaCivita to Srpska's government, the Times reported. Katie Wiles and Calce did not respond to the Times. The U.S. sanctions on Dodik were lifted in October 2025, four months before Continental's contract began, and none of these reports links Katie Wiles's work to that decision.

Context and Caveats

The Southern Interconnection has a genuine energy-security rationale: Bosnia depends entirely on Russian gas, and the EU has set deadlines to phase out Russian imports. The financing is private rather than taxpayer-funded, and the U.S. Department of Energy has framed the effort as part of a broader "Trump Peace Pipelines Framework" to expand American LNG exports. Binnall defended the venture, telling the Guardian: "We are the right team for this. No other group combines on-the-ground presence in Bosnia with strong support in America." AAFS and the Trumps deny any impropriety, and once the legislation designated AAFS, no competitive process was legally required. As of mid-2026, Croatia and Bosnia had signed a framework agreement, but financing, permits, route details, and the final AAFS contract remained to be completed. Analysts warn that entrusting a critical energy route to a venture with no demonstrated ability to build it, outside normal procurement, could leave Bosnia dependent on the goodwill of the same actors it is meant to free it from.

Hungary

On April 15, 2025, Treasury removed Antal Rogán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's cabinet chief, from its sanctions list, RFE/RL reported. The Biden administration had sanctioned him on January 7, 2025, under the Global Magnitsky Act. Treasury said then that he "used his role to enrich himself and those loyal to his party." State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said Rubio told Hungary's foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, that keeping Rogán designated was inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy interests. The Hungarian government said the delisting was a "clear sign that the winds have changed in Washington." On April 18, Shaheen and Warren said the decision "erodes U.S. credibility on anti-corruption policy" and that "The Administration's announcement violates the law," because Congress did not receive required notice, their joint statement said.

On June 29, 2025, Szijjártó said the United States had lifted sanctions that had held up the expansion of Hungary's Paks nuclear plant, which Russia's state nuclear company Rosatom is building, NucNet reported. Neither government gave details. Szijjártó called the measures "politically motivated" and said construction "can now proceed at a faster pace."

On November 7, 2025, after meeting Trump at the White House, Orbán said Hungary had been granted "a complete exemption from sanctions" on Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline and Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline, Al Jazeera reported. The exemption applied to the sanctions Treasury had placed on Rosneft and Lukoil two weeks earlier. Trump said Hungary does not "have the advantage of having the sea." A White House official said the exemption lasts one year, and that Hungary committed to buy U.S. liquefied natural gas under contracts worth "some $600m," Al Jazeera reported. Szijjártó said Hungary had obtained "an indefinite exemption." On November 12, Rubio confirmed the one-year term, the Kyiv Independent reported. He said Hungary's purchases are "a very small piece of what Russia sells" and that losing them "would be deeply destabilizing in Hungary." On Paks, he said, "We want them to be able to complete it because we want them to be energy independent."

Orbán lost Hungary's April 2026 election after the Trump administration campaigned for him, as covered in a separate article. In September 2026, Foreign Minister Anita Orbán of Prime Minister Péter Magyar's new government said Budapest was working to extend the waiver beyond November because the energy company MOL needs more time to diversify its supplies, Reuters reported. More than 90 percent of Hungary's oil and gas imports come from Russia. Hungary's Foreign Ministry says the exemption expires on November 21, Fakti.bg reported. As of October 18, no U.S. response to the request had been reported.

Venezuela

In February 2025, Trump announced that he would revoke the license that let Chevron and other companies operate and export oil in Venezuela, citing migration and democracy concerns, Offshore Technology reported. In late July 2025, Reuters reported that Chevron had received a new restricted license to resume limited operations. The license barred any transfer of oil proceeds to Nicolás Maduro's government.

After U.S. forces captured Maduro on January 3, 2026, Treasury issued a series of general licenses for Venezuela's oil sector. They authorized U.S. companies to buy, ship and refine Venezuelan oil, supply equipment, and deal with the state oil company PDVSA, the law firm Faegre Drinker reported. Payments to the Venezuelan government must go into U.S.-held accounts created by a January 9 executive order. Most licenses exclude dealings with Russia, Iran, North Korea or Cuba, and the main oil license excludes Chinese-controlled entities. The underlying Venezuela executive orders remain in force. On April 1, Treasury lifted its sanctions on interim President Delcy Rodríguez. On October 14, it removed her brother Jorge Rodríguez, president of the National Assembly, from its sanctions list without giving a reason, Al Jazeera reported. A source told Al Jazeera the step was part of Washington's wider recognition of the interim government. The operation and its aftermath are covered in the Venezuela article.

Iran

During the U.S. war with Iran, the administration eased Iran oil sanctions twice. On March 20, 2026, Bessent announced a short-term authorization for sales of Iranian oil already at sea, to bring about 140 million barrels to market, The National News Desk reported. He said, "we will be using the Iranian barrels against Tehran to keep the price down," and that "Iran will have difficulty accessing any revenue generated." On April 15, he said the license would not be renewed.

On June 22, after the two countries signed a preliminary agreement, Treasury issued a 60-day license for the production, delivery and sale of Iranian oil, The New York Times reported. Bessent said, "Iran has committed to free and open transit in the Strait of Hormuz." Daniel Tannebaum of the Atlantic Council noted that relief under the 2015 nuclear deal came only after inspectors verified compliance. On July 7, Treasury revoked the license after tankers were struck in the strait, AFP reported. A U.S. official said the agreement "is entirely performance-based." The agreement's terms, including the release of frozen Iranian assets, and the reactions to it are covered in the Iran war article.

Other Cases

Israeli settlers. On January 20, 2025, his first day back in office, Trump revoked the sanctions program that President Biden had created to target violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank, The Times of Israel reported. It had covered 17 individuals and 16 entities, including the settler movement's development arm, Amana. Reversing it had been a priority for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government. Several Western countries and the EU kept their own settler sanctions in place.

Myanmar. In late July 2025, Treasury removed sanctions from several allies of Myanmar's military government and their companies, including KT Services & Logistics and its founder, the MCM Group, Suntac Technologies, and junta associate Tin Latt Min, AAP reported. It came about two weeks after junta leader Min Aung Hlaing praised Trump and asked him to ease sanctions. Treasury gave no reason. Deputy Treasury Secretary Michael Faulkender said anyone suggesting an "ulterior motive" was "peddling a conspiracy theory driven by hatred for President Trump." Human Rights Watch called the move "extremely worrying," and Representative Ami Bera (D-CA) called it "a bad idea."

Brazil. On December 12, 2025, Treasury removed Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, his wife and the Lex Institute from the sanctions list, CBS News reported. The Trump administration had sanctioned him months earlier over the prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro. A senior administration official cited an amnesty bill passed by Brazil's lower house. The episode is covered in the Brazil article.

The Broader Pattern

The Times framed the Syria episode as an example of a broader dynamic in Trump's second term: "a warped system of executive patronage in which investors donate millions to the president's pet projects, or invest alongside the Trump family, in hopes of achieving their policy goals, even if no explicit ask is ever made." The Bosnia case extends the pattern from the family itself to people in the president's orbit, his lawyer and an adviser's brother, winning a foreign contract as the administration delivered a related policy shift. It also extends to Trump's own political advisers, who were paid by the same Bosnian Serb government after the administration lifted sanctions on its leader, and to a lobbying firm on that government's payroll where the chief of staff's daughter is a partner. The Lukoil case involves a sanctions decision that the administration has not yet made, with a Trump donor and business partners of the negotiators' families among the bidders. The Trump family has publicly stated it intends to continue doing business deals around the world during the second term, a departure from prior presidents of both parties who have sought to avoid even the perception of conflicts of interest.

The policies themselves have arguments on the merits. Repealing Syria sanctions and reducing the Balkans' reliance on Russian gas both had support before this administration, and the Syria repeal passed Congress with bipartisan backing. The parties in those cases deny that business ties influenced policy, and Witkoff denies any conflict of interest in the Lukoil talks. In other cases, such as Russia's diesel and oil waivers, the administration has cited fuel prices during the Iran war, while critics in Congress, Ukraine and Europe say the relief funds Russia's war.